

## **Iqbal's Visions of Civilization, Modernity and Nationalism: Are his Ideas Relevant Today?**

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In his New Year's message, a few months before his death in 1938, Poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) said, "the modern age prides itself on its progress in knowledge and its matchless scientific developments. No doubt, the pride is justified. Today space and time are being annihilated and man is achieving amazing successes in unveiling the secrets of nature and harnessing its forces to his own service." However, Iqbal had both appreciation and apprehension about the Western civilization. He was living at a time when some negative ideologies were emerging in Europe in the guise of civilization. He observed, "[i]n spite of all these developments, the tyranny of imperialism struts abroad, covering its face under the masks of Democracy, Nationalism, Communism, Fascism and heaven knows what else besides. Under these masks, in every corner of the earth, the spirit of freedom and the dignity of man are being trampled underfoot in a way to which not even the darkest period of human history presents a parallel."<sup>1</sup>

Nationalism was the main motivating force in world politics during Iqbal's time, and he clearly censured the idea. Referring to the Spanish Civil War, in the same New Year's message, he said:

This one event shows clearly that national unity too is not a very durable force. Only one unity is dependable, and that unity is the brotherhood of man, which is above race, nationality, colour or language. So long as this so-called democracy, this accursed nationalism and this degraded imperialism are not shattered, so long as men do not demonstrate by their actions that they believe that the whole world is the family of God, so long as distinctions of race, colour and geographical nationalities are not wiped out completely, they will never be able to lead a happy and contented life and the beautiful ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity will

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never materialise.

Interestingly during the early days of his poetic career Iqbal wrote in admiration of Indian nationalism, but with maturity he identified many flaws not only of the idea of nationalism but many other weaknesses of Western civilization. By way of his interaction with Indian nationalist leaders, he became convinced that the idea of nationalism under the guise of modern civilization needed ethical commitment to culture, peace and prosperity. His studies of Islam convinced him that Islamic teachings had the potential to save the declining Western civilization. When he realized that Indian nationalist leaders were not going to go above their caste-ridden fanatic nationalist fervor, he in 1930 called for a separate nation for Muslims in India. He believed that in a Muslim-majority nation state, citizens will have the opportunity to put Islamic values into practice, and will have the potential to become a model for development not only for Indian Muslims, but for the whole of humanity in the modern world. Unfortunately Iqbal's vision has not materialized. Based on his vision Pakistan came into existence, but Pakistan has not fulfilled his dream. Far from it, many observers including academics and journalists began to question whether or not Pakistan was a failed state.<sup>2</sup> What went wrong? Was Iqbal having a wrong perception about Qur'anic teachings? Was Iqbal's vision irrelevant? Alternatively, one would assume that the Pakistani leaders were simply incapable understanding Iqbal's dream. How would a united India been different from his concept of a separate homeland for Muslims? What characteristics would make Pakistan a unique nation in the modern world? We examine these questions in this paper. With the rise of racial ideologies around the world today, above questions have become even more relevant. We examine seven decades of Pakistan's history and evaluate Iqbal's visions of civilization, modernity, nationalism and the future of humanity.

### **Iqbal and Nationalism**

We begin our discussion by raising questions that are more fundamental. What is nationalism? How does the idea of nationalism relate to human civilization? How does one relate one's relationship a specific nation? One may define nationalism simply as one's collective identity connected to one's ancestral land. Although people were generally aware of their attachment to hereditary land and culture since the beginning of human history and civilization, nationalism as a political ideology demanded their absolute loyalty and sentiment molding public and private life – a development that occurred only in 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe. Under the impact

of the Enlightenment this phenomenon was discovered as a scientific cultural identity and then the Romantic tradition added emotional attachment to it. The concept of nationalism gained popular legitimacy.<sup>3</sup> Soon nationalism began to be identified with nation-states claiming absolute loyalty of citizens. Under the impact of Social Darwinism, nationalism occasionally turned extreme and fanatic. It was this form of nationalism that Iqbal was concerned about.<sup>4</sup> Iqbal was apprehensive of the potential abuse of human dignity in the name of national solidarity.

A Universalist Iqbal, who had once expressed his admiration for the Hindu deity Rama as *Imam al-Hind* or leader of India, was already disturbed with the growth of frenzied nationalism in Europe; but now the Indian National Congress led nationalism appeared even more fanatic to him than the nationalist zeal he had witnessed in Europe. He became worried about Muslims and other minorities losing their identity and dignity under the caste ridden Hindu leadership. Therefore, he suggested dividing India by creating a Muslim nation-state where they could practice Islamic universal values such as human self-esteem, universal equality and justice. He proposed the formation of a state constituting the Muslim majority areas of India. He argued:

It is not the unity of language or country or the identity of economic interests that constitutes the basic principle of our nationality. It is because we all believe in a certain view of the universe...that we are members of the society founded by the Prophet of Islam. Islam abhors all material limitations, and bases its nationality on purely abstract ideas objectified in a potential expansive group of personalities.<sup>5</sup>

At this stage, Iqbal seems to have been primarily interested in establishing the legitimacy of his demand for a separate nation for Indian Muslims *vis-à-vis* Indian nationalism. In so doing, however, Iqbal encountered a new problem, i.e. the problem of relation between this new nationality and other Islamic nationalities, for 19<sup>th</sup> century European nationalism was strictly based on geographical territorial identity.<sup>6</sup> Iqbal resolved this question by suggesting that:

For the present, every Muslim nation must sink into her deeper self; temporarily focus her vision on herself alone, until all are strong and powerful to form a living family of republics. A true and living unity, according to the nationalist thinkers, is not so easy as to be achieved by a merely symbolical overlordship. It is truly manifested

in a multiplicity of free, independent units whose racial rivalries are adjusted and harmonized by the unifying bond of a common spiritual inspiration. It seems to me that Islam is neither Nationalism nor Imperialism but a League of Nations which recognized artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only, and not for restricting the social horizon of its members.<sup>7</sup>

One must note here a unique characteristic of Iqbal's view of nationalism: While Europe during this period, under the impact of Social Darwinism, was moving toward totalitarianism, Iqbal's perception of nationalism was like German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) humanitarian and universal which recognized natural divisions within the human family. Iqbal wanted to achieve unity of the Muslim Ummah through the Pakistani nation. In fact, in his thought one may find a sound response to the spiritual crisis of European thought reflected in Friedrich Nietzsche's (1844-1900) views. Iqbal believed that Islam had the potential of providing solutions to Europe's crises. One author has rightly pointed out that he "found no opposition between reason and revelation or science and religion," and he "developed a creative synthesis of the East and the West."<sup>8</sup> He believed that the Muslim community (Ummah) had the potential to be a model for the humanity, and he wanted Pakistan to take the initiative to revive the Ummah with the spirit of humanism.

### **Iqbal and the Individual Self**

Iqbal was aware of independence of the human soul in his understanding of the human nature and individual's role in civilizational growth. He expressed his views about the potential power of the individual soul mostly in poetry. In *Asrar-i Khudi* and *Rumuz-i Bikhudi*, both written in Persian, Iqbal claims that every individual soul, enlightened by the Divinely spirit, has the potential to cultivate in his/ her personality underlying forces to encounter life's challenges. One is capable of freeing oneself from the grip of external forces to become master of one's destiny. When an individual is free and powerful, he or she then is capable of participating in the progress of society and civilization. As one author has pointed out,

Individuals, in Iqbal's view, can develop their full potential only within society and only when they contribute to the larger objectives of the community to which they belong. In a very real sense, one can speak of a communal self just as one speaks of the individual self.<sup>9</sup>

Iqbal was interested in creating a convenient space for every individual to flourish and prosper in a free and conducive environment. When individuals are free and happy, they contribute to civilizational growth. Therefore, when he envisioned a Muslim nation, he wanted its citizens to be guided by Qur'anic teachings and harmonize their differences through a common spiritual bond. In his critical appreciation of the German philosopher, Iqbal held that, "Nietzsche had a heart of a believer but the head of an infidel." Therefore, if Muslims are able to cultivate the individual heart enlightened with the Qur'anic teaching, they will have the potential to lead the world.

Iqbal's spiritual vision was given an applied shape by Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1875-1948), who came to be known as *Quaid-i-Azam* or the great leader, in a concept that has been called the two-nation theory. Jinnah, who was known as an ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity, had left India for England after being frustrated with the Indian National Congress leadership because of their communal stained nationalism. Iqbal persuaded Jinnah to return to India in order to lead Indian Muslims at a very critical moment of their history. The Muslim community in India had become miserable under the impact of European colonialism and Hindu communalism. Under colonialism Muslims not only had lost their economic comfort that they had enjoyed for centuries, they also lost their fundamental dignity and pride. In demanding an independent and sovereign Muslim state they expected that they would be free to run their affairs based on Qur'anic teachings and will have the potential not only to revive their glorious past, but also will have the potential to become a model of development and prosperity for others in the modern world.

After more than seven decades, one must admit that Iqbal's vision has not been materialized in contemporary Pakistan. Therefore, naturally questions arise as to what went wrong in Pakistan. Was Iqbal wrong in his perception of the potential of Qur'anic guidance for good governance? Could external forces be held responsible for this failure? These questions demand some analyses of Pakistan's history.

### **The Islamic State Controversy**

One of the early challenges that Pakistan encountered as a sovereign nation-state was the framing of a constitution that would ensure universal values of human dignity and equality as opposed to a narrow nationalistic loom. This was unavoidable because, no matter however Iqbal wanted to adjust European modernist perception of a sovereign nation-state with

Islamic Universalist worldview, framing of a constitution of a sovereign nation-state in the 20<sup>th</sup> century was not going to be easy. Jinnah, who was elected president of the First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, took oath under the chairmanship of Jogendra Nath Mandal (1904-1968), a low-caste Hindu politician who became Pakistan's first Minister of Law and Labour.<sup>10</sup> Yet one question that emerged in formulating the constitution of the newly independent Pakistan was that of the status of non-Muslims in the proposed nation. In the 1947 debates of the First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Jinnah argued:

... (Every Pakistani is) a citizen of this state with equal rights privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make ... we are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens to one state. ..I think we should keep that in front as our ideal, and you will find that in the course of time Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense citizens of the state.<sup>11</sup>

These early developments regarding Pakistan's future constitution created some discrepancy and debate. In fact, Jinnah's declarations created controversy even before Pakistan came into existence. Jinnah had once emphatically rejected a suggestion by Lord Mountbatten, the last British viceroy to India, that Pakistan should follow the Mughal Emperor Akbar's approach to religion. Jinnah categorically rejected Mountbatten's guidance and emphatically declared that Pakistan would follow the Prophetic example rather than that of the Mughal emperor Akbar.<sup>12</sup> He said, "the holy Prophet had not only created a new state but laid down the principles on which it could be organized and conducted."<sup>13</sup> Jinnah's statements on the issue however convinced some scholars to suggest that Jinnah was a secular.<sup>14</sup> These scholars hardly discussed whether secularism simply meant freedom of individual choice or secularism meant total separation of religious ideas in politics. If secularism meant the latter, clearly neither Jinnah nor Iqbal was secular. Both Jinnah and Iqbal undoubtedly wanted to incorporate Qur'anic ideas of good governance in their perception of Pakistan's administration. Interestingly, Saleena Karim in her work came up with an astonishing discovery: the second Chief Justice of Pakistan faked one of Jinnah's statements in Pakistan's constitutional development and changed the country's course of history. We shall now investigate this development.

The debate on the framework of the constitution continued both inside and outside the Constituent Assembly, which existed from 1947 to 1954. In 1949, the assembly adopted an "Objective Resolution" for framing the constitution and all groups, irrespective of their political affiliation, participated in it. The resolution declared that the future constitution would be modeled on European constitutions following Islamic guidelines.<sup>15</sup> A Pakistani historian of constitutional development describes the situation following the creation of the state as follows: "the phrase 'Islamic State' had been on the lips of almost all intelligentsia of Pakistan, and had produced an immense volume of talk and enthusiasm; yet the term had not been precisely defined."<sup>16</sup> Islamic clauses were incorporated into the proposed constitution, but the constitution "did not give any special privilege or exclusive power to the Ulema (religious scholars)", because it was believed that "such a clause might prove to be an excellent tool in the hands of reactionary ulema."<sup>17</sup> By intelligentsia the author means Pakistanis educated along the lines of European liberal educational framework. A U.S. Embassy report in 1948 observed: "'an Islamic State' [became] a political motto to be used by the Muslim League to continue indefinitely their predominant position in Pakistan politics."<sup>18</sup>

The conflict between two groups of intellectuals characterized the constitutional development of Pakistan. The President of Pakistan, Iskandar Ali Khan Mirza, warned the *'ulama* to "keep religion out of politics."<sup>19</sup> G. W. Choudhury, an academic who participated in the constitution-making process, describes the situation as follows: "The Pakistani intelligentsia are elaborating a new twentieth-century and authoritative interpretation of Islam, and when they wish to see Pakistan become Islamic, their picture of an Islamic State is altogether different from that of the *ulema*, and it is not greatly dissimilar from that of a modern democratic state."<sup>20</sup>

Interestingly, not only the first law minister, a Hindu, endorsed the Objective Resolution; Justice Cornelius, a practicing Catholic and the 4<sup>th</sup> Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan who had served as law secretary to the first law minister and the first prime minister, endorsed the 1956 constitution and worked hard to put the constitution into practice.<sup>21</sup> In addition, Muhammad Asad (1900-1992), an Austrian convert to Islam who was involved in advising the Government of Pakistan, made significant recommendations to the constitution making process at the time.<sup>22</sup> Yet Pakistan has failed in fulfilling objectives of its founding fathers. Most Pakistanis agree that their nation has failed to achieve its objectives that

were envisioned by the Iqbal and Jinnah, but they blame mostly external schemes for this letdown. Although one cannot ignore the phenomenon of Pakistan's external adversaries – the Indian leaders did not keep it secret that they had expected Pakistan to collapse within months. They not only refused to give Pakistan its share of funds from the British Indian treasury, they also imposed a war in Kashmir. Yet Pakistan survived, but it has failed to achieve its goal envisioned by Iqbal. Why? Answer to this question demands reexamining some aspects of Pakistan's early history.

### Conspiratorial Politics

A compromise in the constitution making process was reached after nine years which was promulgated in 1956. Pakistan was declared to be an Islamic Republic with a parliamentary form of government. During the discussion period, the first prime minister was assassinated and it has never been established who was behind his assassination. Earlier, Governor General Muhammad Ali Jinnah died in suspicious circumstances, and no official enquiry was conducted on the issue. A book written by his personal physician that describes the circumstances of his death, but it remained banned in Pakistan for three decades.<sup>23</sup> The ruling political party the Muslim League had already crumbled, provincial parties came into prominence and the overall political situation in the country became chaotic.<sup>24</sup> British trained bureaucrats came forward to promote their personal ambition: among them Malik Ghulam Muhammad was at the forefront. Applying certain malicious schemes, he managed to become Pakistan's Governor General and declared martial law in 1953 in the Punjab province to consolidate bureaucratic power. When he was challenged in the court, Justice Munir came up with the term "doctrine of necessity" to justify the declaration. Not only did Justice Munir craft the term doctrine of necessity, he also faked a statement of Jinnah to justify what he called "secular Jinnah."<sup>25</sup> Justice Munir's manipulation of facts have been exposed by Saleena Karim, a British-Pakistani historian in her *Secular Jinnah and Pakistan*.<sup>26</sup> One segment of the Pakistani society, nevertheless, accepted Munir's view of Jinnah as a great discovery about Jinnah's orientation of being secular. Munir claims in the first reprint edition of his book *From Jinnah to Zia* "published on the 15th of October 1979, and the last copy was sold on the 15th of January 1980." This indicates the acceptability of Munir's thesis about Jinnah. Although Munir's view was rejected by Pakistan's official version of history,<sup>27</sup> it has continued to steer Pakistani politics not only about Jinnah's political legacy, but also incorporating many aspects of Pakistani life.



Then came another major player in Pakistan's conspiratorial politics – General, later self-proclaimed Field Marshal – Mohammad Ayub Khan. Although he was not the senior most armed forces officer when Pakistan came into existence, he managed not only to occupy the position of the commander in chief; he also managed to extend his tenure for more than three years, normal for the position. Under the 1956 constitution, a general election was scheduled to be held in 1958, but before the constitution could become effective, President Iskandar Mirza, a retired general turned bureaucrat, abrogated the constitution and declared martial law in Pakistan. Within weeks, Ayub Khan replaced Iskandar Mirza and took control of the country. Civilian politicians were already lining up behind the civilian-military bureaucracy in establishing an oligarchic rule in Pakistan.<sup>28</sup> Iqbal and Jinnah's vision of Pakistan was devastated.

In Pakistan, however, most people blame external forces for conspiring against their nation for the failure in achieving the objective envisioned by Iqbal. This question demands some serious reflection. Analysts generally fail to note that Islamophobia, which is widely discussed today in examining the relationship between Islamic and Western civilizations, is not a new phenomenon in global intellectual history. Edward Said has established this aptly in his *Orientalism* (1978). Since Pakistan was achieved in the name of Islam, some Islamophobic elements took note of it. Pakistan's founding fathers were skeptical about the former Soviet Union because of Stalin's oppressive policies toward Muslims in the central Asian region. This pushed Pakistan toward the United States during the bi-polar global system. An Indian author has rightly pointed out that during the first decade of Pak-US relationship; Pakistan's gain was minimal.<sup>29</sup> However, Pak-US relationship continued to grow and although the US seemed to have sided with Pakistan, the USSR played a decisive role in breaking up of Pakistan in 1971.<sup>30</sup> The Soviet news agency Pravda popularized the saga of 3 million people killed in the 1971 conflict in former East Pakistan, now Bangladesh.

The Pakistani perception of US conspiracy against their nation began to take deeper root after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. With the help of Pakistan, the US administration established forces to fight the Soviets and soon numerous enthusiastic young Muslim men from all over the world joined the Afghan Mujahidin. This had a huge ripple effect: by 1989, the Soviet Union had collapsed but not the militant groups created during this period. We shall return to discussing the role of external

powers in Pakistan later in this essay. Let us now devote our discussion on the role of education in nation building.

### **Education and Nation Building**

Like their co-religionists in other parts of the world, Indian Muslims could lay claim to a rich cultural and intellectual tradition based on Islamic teachings.<sup>31</sup> Warren Hastings (1732-1818), the first Governor General of India, established Calcutta *Madrasah* in 1781.<sup>32</sup> A *madrasah* or an Islamic educational institution was necessary for the continuation of the judicial administration in the newly acquired territory. However, as the East India Company (EIC) Administration consolidated its power in India, it introduced a new education policy. Although the traditional system of education was allowed to exist, its products would not find employment outside the mosque. The EIC introduced what has been known as the “divide and rule” policy, and since the EIC captured power from a Muslim ruler, it promoted the Hindus. A new Hindu aristocracy was patronized, which has been termed as the Bengal renaissance.<sup>33</sup> In the process, the Company rulers crushed the Muslim aristocracy in Bengal.<sup>34</sup> By 1835 the EIC introduced a system that was formulated by the British liberal philosopher, T.B. Macaulay commonly known as Lord Macaulay (1800-1859), an official of the EIC in Bengal, in order “to form a class of persons, Indian in blood and color, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect.”<sup>35</sup> Bureaucrats that Pakistan inherited in 1947 were all product of this system, and among them, there were very few Bengali speaking officials because of the hundred years of EIC rule from 1757 to 1857.

In keeping with its ideological commitments, attempts were made to reformulate the educational policy in Pakistan.<sup>36</sup> A meeting was convened in 1946 to discuss the future education system. Discussion continued after the creation of Pakistan under the leadership of the first Education Minister, Fazlur Rahman (1905-1966), who emphasized the need for an Islamic ideological foundation for an education policy.<sup>37</sup> The Ministry of Education organized a conference of leading experts and a number of recommendations were made, but none of these were implemented because of the reluctance of the Ministry of Finance, whose bureaucrats were not convinced that the newly born Pakistan should spend funds on education.<sup>38</sup> Academic institutions continued to operate under the previous (British colonial) system of education. Pakistani leaders continued to provide lip service to Islamic principles for public consumption. Without

guidelines, the education system was, as Qureshi put it, aimless.<sup>39</sup> The historian complains that the need for creating Pakistani personality through education was ignored by the government. He continues:

It was the Pakistan Movement that weaned most (Muslim youth) from Indian nationalism and some from Marxist materialism. The enthusiasm for Pakistan created the feeling that all was well with the Muslim youth. Even earlier that was the general sentiment. A generation that had pursued the aim of economic welfare through the acquisition of the new education and had remained Muslim in sentiment because of tradition and the influence of its parents and homes thought that what had happened to it would happen to its children as well, forgetting that the Islamic influence grew more and more diluted because of the ever increasing impact of new influences percolating through literature and amoral and religiously neutral education. The nature of the education was such that the potentially positive influence that could have been exerted in favour of the Islamic code of morals and beliefs was eliminated, and the subtle European suggestions conveyed through literature and textbooks were permitted to play their role unhindered.<sup>40</sup>

Qureshi became Minister of Education for a short period and held the highest position at a major public university in Pakistan for more than a decade. He continued to articulate the failure of Pakistan's education policy until his death in 1979. He blamed public policy for its failure to develop a national identity based on Islamic ideas.<sup>41</sup> This failure, he suggested, led to the growth of Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan, a growth that eventually culminated into the creation of Bangladesh.<sup>42</sup> Responsibility for this failure, the author maintained, squarely belonged to the bureaucrats who ran the country. However, the dilemma of the statement is that why were the bureaucrats able to undermine the political leadership? Qureshi was a member of Pakistan's first Constituent Assembly and served as the education minister for a while, and yet he had to succumb to bureaucrats. Why? Pakistani historians have not addressed this critical question.

### **The Challenge of Linguistic Identity and Breakup of Pakistan**

The failure of the education policy led the Pakistani society into a severe identity crisis. Pakistan came into existence based on the Muslim identity in India, but the Pakistani leadership failed to formulate their constitution and their education policy by incorporating Islamic ideas and values. This

created an enormous uncertainty in the country.<sup>43</sup> Summarizing Pakistan's identity crisis and discontent one Pakistani author, who has served at the World Bank for many years, says:

Conflict with India from the start, lack of sincere and honest leadership, corrupt politicians, slow growth of the democratic institutions, excessive power in the hands of civil and military authorities, widespread poverty and unemployment, breakdown of law and order, human rights violations, excessive influence and interference of the Western powers have all contributed to the current discontent.<sup>44</sup>

We shall undertake the issue of foreign intervention in Pakistani affairs elsewhere, but it should be noted that the creation of Bangladesh, based on the linguistic identity of East Pakistanis, is the most striking example for the failure of the Pakistani identity.

Under the civil-military oligarchic rule, the economic gap between the two geographically separated territories<sup>45</sup> – a gap that had existed during the British period – was further widened. Bengali-speaking Eastern Pakistanis suffered from economic disparity and were deprived of their proper share in the civil-military bureaucracy of government administration. In theory and on moral grounds, East Pakistanis were to be granted special privilege because of certain reasons: First, Bengali Muslims were at the forefront of Indian independence movement since 1857. Then from the formation of All India Muslim League in Dhaka in 1906 Bengali Muslims were at the vanguard of the movement of self-determination. Although newly coined term Pakistan did not incorporate the territory of Bengal, a Bengali leader drafted the famous Pakistan Resolution of 1940. The main reason for overwhelming support for Pakistan among Bengali Muslims was because they had suffered most under the British rule. Iqbal's idea of universal human dignity appealed to them most. It is noteworthy that the Bengali-speaking Muslims of East Bengal sacrificed a number of their Constituent Assembly seats to Urdu-speaking Muslims including that of Liaquat Ali Khan, the first prime minister of Pakistan, in the 1946 elections. However, instead of treating East Pakistanis with dignity and parity, civil and military bureaucrats created further discrepancy between East and West Pakistan.<sup>46</sup>

Almost nothing was done to minimize the linguistic differences between the two components of Pakistan. Little was done to cultivate goodwill between the peoples of the two wings based on Islamic values. Islam

remained the only connection, but justification of disparity between the two wings of Pakistan only brought disgrace to Islam. Challenges of Pakistan idea began to appear in the name of secularism. Gradually, anti-West Pakistani sentiments developed in East Pakistan and within 25 years of the creation of Pakistan, another nation-state, Bangladesh, emerged challenging the foundational ideology of the country.

### **Emergence of *Naya* (new) Pakistan**

The *naya* or new Pakistan, as its new leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928-1979) described it, was no more Iqbal and Jinnah's vision of Pakistan. Following a nine-month long civil war in East Pakistan an all-out Indo-Pakistan war broke out in December 1971 and within days, the government in East Pakistan collapsed. A humiliated armed force bowed down to the new leader who had emerged as the undisputed leader in Western wing of Pakistan. Many Pakistanis regarded Bhutto a charismatic, intelligent and capable leader. However, he also seemed to have had learned well from Pakistan's conspiratorial politics: his letter to Iskandar Mirza cited earlier reflects his personality. He expected the same type of loyalty from his subordinates as he had offered to Iskandar Mirza.<sup>47</sup> However, Bhutto succeeded in giving a new life to a shattered country.

A new constitution promulgated in 1973 re-asserted Pakistan's commitment to an Islamic moral standard (Part II, Article 2b). Bhutto declared Islamic socialism as his motto for governance, but he served interests only of the landed aristocracy of the country. He served Islam by replacing Sunday with Friday as the weekly holiday, banning public consumption of alcohol, and declaring the Ahmadi, also known as Qadiani,<sup>48</sup> community a non-Muslim minority. He did little to ensure social, political, and economic justice for the common people. However, the severest blow that Pakistan suffered at the inception of this new Pakistan was on the Kashmir issue. Before he took office, when Pakistan was still united, he played in the hands of Indian conspirators and provided the Indians with the opportunity to sever air link between the two wings of Pakistan.<sup>49</sup> He also played a drama at the UN while rejecting a Polish resolution that could have been a face-saving saga for Pakistan.<sup>50</sup> Bhutto then signed the Simla Accord in 1972 by declaring the Kashmir issue a bilateral one and thus Pakistan played in the hands of Indians to turn a universal human right issue to a national issue. It also saved the former Soviet Union from casting veto at the United Nations. On the domestic front, Bhutto attempted to establish a strong centralized

government under his leadership by eliminating rivals both within his ruling party and the opposition, but it backfired. His government collapsed in 1977 after a major mass protest against Bhutto's alleged rigging of the general elections held earlier in the year. A military general handpicked by him, not because of seniority or talent, but based on his personal choice, overthrew him in a military seizure.

General Zia ul-Haq took power promising that he would hand over power to civilian politicians after conducting a general election within ninety days. However, that did not happen. It is difficult to establish whether this was due to the General's taste for political power or due to his perceived fear of Bhutto's revenge against his extra-constitutional act. Zia began to look for excuses for staying in power and soon he found one: the ideological foundation of Pakistan. Bhutto's declared program for socialism and the popular demand for "Nizam-i-Mustafa" or the Prophet's rule expressed by street protesters, provided Zia with a good justification for hanging onto power. He found instant backing from religiously oriented political parties including *Jamaat-i-Islami* (JI). Interestingly, although JI had claimed to stand for democratic rule in Pakistan, it joined Zia's declared Islamization process. Soon, however, they disagreed on their vision and methodology of implementation of their ideas. While JI demanded a democratic election (although most of the times they did not perform well in the elections), Zia, like his predecessor Ayub Khan, wanted to ensure his personal leadership through some form of 'democratic' glaze. Increasingly JI intensified its campaign against the government which resulted in increased repression and banning of all student unions which were largely dominated by the student supporters of the party. This confrontation ended when the military ruler died in a plane crash in 1988.

Zia, however, found support from an unexpected quarter that helped him hanging onto power for 11 years. The Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan (1979-1989), where a jihad was launched by many Afghans together with many foreign fighters with the support of the United States, provided Zia with the opportunity to claim for legitimacy for his rule in the name of Islam and national security. This period, however, planted the seed for the growth of militancy in Pakistan mostly in the name of Islam.<sup>51</sup> This period also deepened the involvement of foreign powers, particularly of the United States, in Pakistani politics. We shall now briefly describe political developments in the country since the end of the Cold War.

Zia's demise was followed by a decade of democratic government, but these democratically elected leaders were engaged in huge corruption scandals. Pakistan again saw a military intervention in 1999, which lasted for almost 9 years. Following 9/11, initially Pakistan seemed to have been coerced to facilitate US actions in Afghanistan,<sup>52</sup> but then seemed to have volunteered cooperation to US actions in the region. However, indiscriminate US activities in the region only infuriated the people of Pakistan and anti-US sentiment sky-rocketed in Pakistan. Yet within years the US decided to abandon the military ruler General Parvez Musharraf and Pakistan returned to so-called democratic rule in 2008. However, with the rise of extremist groups in association with the wars in Afghanistan, the controversy on the idea of Islamic state re-emerged in Pakistan.

### **Renewed Role of Islam**

In spite of the differences between General Zia's and JI's vision of Islam, during the military ruler's eleven years tenure Pakistan saw some form of political stability and the role of Islam seemed to have become further fortified in Pakistani politics. However, hardly any attention was paid to how Islamic ideas could contribute to good governance. Qur'anic ideas such as *amanah* (trust), *shura* (consultation), *ukhuwah* (brotherhood), *'adalah* (justice) were frequently repeated in political rhetoric, were rarely translated to governing features of the country. The Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan and the subsequent jihad strengthened and internationalized the role of Islam. Thousands of Pakistani youth, mostly unguided, enthusiastically joined the jihad in Afghanistan along with many Afghan and foreign fighters. With the blessings of Western powers such as the United States and Muslim powers such as Saudi Arabia, radical fighters succeeded in bringing down the pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan. Interestingly, however, during this process many Pakistani fighters seemed to have begun contemplating on liberating neighboring Kashmir through the same process. During this period, there was also a rise of traditional Islam that Iqbal had condemned in his poetry.

All through the decade long civilian rule following the fall of Zia regime, Pakistan held four national elections, had four national assemblies dissolved, and three prime ministers dismissed. Two leaders – Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto – emerged as politically influential and alternatively occupied the position of the prime minister of Pakistan: both demonstrated their commitment to Islam by frequently performing *'umrah* (lesser

pilgrimage), visiting shrines, and particularly Benazir Bhutto by wearing head scarf and rolling prayer beads in her hands. Commitment to Islam became more ritualistic than practical. Islamic teachings, such ideas as brotherhood, equality, consultation, poverty eradication, trust and justice, were shelved. Corruption increased to a point that Transparency International (TI) listed the country among the top most corrupted countries in the world. Corrupt practices and rhetoric on Islamic commitments did not seem to be contradictory to politicians. The country fell into a deep economic crisis to the extent that the government would not be able to pay even its own officials without an IMF or World Bank loan. More than half of its gross national income would go for debt services. In 1999, the so-called civilian democratic rule in Pakistan ended with another military coup.

The new military led government initially performed well in handling economic and financial problems; terms of debt services improved, but at a very high cost. In the Bush administration's War on Terror, it sided with what U.S. President Bush called "us." Like early military administrators, Ayub Khan and Ziaul Haq, President Musharraf consolidated his position as the head of state but refused to give up his position as the chief of the armed forces. This brought the government into direct confrontation with conventional political forces. The General decided to align with the U.S. led war against terrorism without any public debate on the issue. Slowly the Islamists came into direct confrontation with U.S. led activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While Musharraf came up with his "enlightened moderation" version of Islam, his opponents saw in him foreign intervention in the guise of the war on terrorism.<sup>53</sup> This created an almost anarchic political situation in Pakistan.

### **The Conflict in Kashmir and the Rise of Militancy**

For the Pakistani youth, who were motivated to fight in Afghanistan, there was hardly any difference between the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and Indian occupation of Kashmir. The conflict in Kashmir began in 1947 when India invaded the territory. The UN declared the territory disputed, and based on the principle of self-determination, the world body resolved to conduct a plebiscite in order for the people of Kashmir to decide the future of the territory. This resolution seeking peace, however, turned out to be just the beginning of a long and bloody conflict in the history of the UN. In fact, along with Palestine, Kashmir is the only other unresolved conflict in the world that has haunted the world body.



India has flouted most UN resolutions on the issue and refused to take the dispute to the International Court of Justice.<sup>54</sup> Defying UN resolutions on the subject the Indian authorities went ahead to hold what they called a democratic election in 1951. It was a total sham: with blessings from Delhi, Sheikh Abdullah's party won 73 seats out of 75. The seats were won uncontested because the Election Commission refused to accept opposition candidates. According to opposition sources, since then all subsequent elections in Kashmir have been heavily rigged.<sup>55</sup>

Pakistan has been involved in the issue of Kashmir since 1947. In fact, the whole question has been viewed as a dispute between the two countries and because of this perception; the people of Kashmir have suffered. Initially Pakistan played a positive role in Kashmir both for its own sake and for the people of Kashmir. This was reflected in Pakistan's acceptance of UN resolutions on the subject. Pakistan, however, began to compromise on Kashmir following its defeat with India in 1971. It signed the Simla Agreement declaring the internationally recognized dispute as a bilateral one. One Indian document claims that the Pakistani prime minister had promised India that "his country would accept the Line of Control (LOC) in the state of J&K as the de facto border and would not try to de-stabilise it."<sup>56</sup> However, the document also claims that the Pakistani prime minister pleaded with the Indian prime minister that if such a clause were to formally enter in the agreement, it "would cause domestic problems for him." Therefore, the Indian prime minister "magnanimously accepted his promise and did not formalize that part of the agreement."<sup>57</sup> Nevertheless, Pakistan, as later events were to prove, never kept its part of the deal, the Indian document claimed.

The Indian document has rightly pointed out that Pakistan did not "keep its part of the deal" because all Pakistani administrations have not only expressed their rhetorical support for the people of Kashmir in international diplomacy; they are also reported to have assisted Kashmiri protesters against Indian military rule. At least that is how the Indian government and intelligence agencies have perceived the role of Pakistan in Kashmir. This diplomatic support, however, has hardly changed anything in the life of the people of Kashmir. In fact, since the Simla Agreement Pakistan's so-called diplomatic support has had a negative impact on the issue. This agreement made Kashmir a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan: Pakistan lost its ground internationally. To complicate the matter Kashmiries burned the effigy of another

“democratically elected” Pakistani leader, Asif Zardari, when he claimed that ‘terrorists’ were operating in Kashmir.<sup>58</sup> All these contributed to the rise of frustration among the Pakistani youth.

### **The Role of External Powers**

In Pakistan, one would commonly find references to anti-Pakistani external forces while explaining seditious political events and terrorist acts.<sup>59</sup> This is mainly because most Pakistanis believe that India never accepted the creation of the country and from the very inception, it has been engaged in schemes to dismember Pakistan. This popular view is supported by the fact that India refused to deliver 500 million rupees from the British Indian treasury to Pakistan during the partition.<sup>60</sup> India also refused Pakistan’s armed forces their due share of arms and ammunition of the British-Indian administration citing the Kashmir war as reason. This made Pakistan’s new administration dependent on serving bureaucrats and militant tribes in the mountainous regions near the Afghan borders for the war in Kashmir. This made the political establishment weak that has been reflected in the fate of the Muslim League, the political party that led the independence movement. India also secured Soviet vetoes in the UN Security Council on Kashmir: this brought suffering not only for the people of Kashmir, but also for all Pakistanis.<sup>61</sup>

Many Pakistanis also blame India for the dismemberment of Pakistan. Interestingly although most Bangladeshis consider the 1971 war as their war of independence, most Indians and Pakistanis see it as the third war between the two nations. However, international observers concur that without Indian intervention it would have been impossible to create Bangladesh. In addition, it has now been established that India not only aided Bangladesh’s secession from united Pakistan, it also secured Soviet participation in dismembering Pakistan.<sup>62</sup>

Although initially many Pakistanis viewed the United States as a friendly superpower, the perception changed significantly in latter decades. The relationship began to deteriorate immediately following the Afghan war of the 1980s and it worsened following the Bush Administration’s declaration of the War on Terror. Pakistani expectations rose up again when Barack Obama became president in 2009, but within years hopes were dashed once again.

In an interview with MSNBC, president-elect Barack Obama expressed the view that militancy in Afghanistan and Pakistan could not be handled properly without addressing the problem of the Kashmir dispute. He also announced that he would appoint the former president Bill Clinton to mediate in the crisis between India and Pakistan.<sup>63</sup> An unhappy Indian External Affairs minister immediately said, “essentially it has been stated that it is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan.”<sup>64</sup> Increasingly the Obama administration came under pressure from pro-Indian lobbies, which was supported by pro-Israeli elements, to drop the idea. Therefore the proposal to appoint Bill Clinton to mediate on the issue was dropped. However, immediately after taking office President Obama appointed senior diplomat Richard Holbrooke to deal with the Afghan-Pakistan conflict. Immediately the pro-Indian lobby in Washington intervened and got Kashmir deleted out of Holbrooke’s assignment. The *Foreign Policy* reported, “the omission of India from his title and from Clinton's official remarks introducing the new diplomatic push in the region was no accident -- not to mention a sharp departure from Obama's own previously stated approach of engaging India, as well as Pakistan and Afghanistan, in a regional dialogue.”<sup>65</sup> However, India successfully lobbied the Obama transition team to make sure that neither India nor Kashmir was included in Holbrooke's official brief. Under the Obama Administration, drone strikes in Pakistan had increased manifold raising questions about the US design for Pakistan. Initially under the Trump Administration, the anti-American sentiment in Pakistan further increased due to Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric. However, following the recent visit of Imran Khan and Trump’s offers to mediate in the Kashmir dispute, many Pakistanis see hope the future relationship between the two countries.

### **Another Naya Pakistan: The PTI Manifesto**

Pakistan’s current Prime Minister Imran Khan has again come up with the idea of a new Pakistan. This time however, not with the chorus of socialism, but with the motto of “a just and equitable society based on the system that Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) laid down in the Medina Charter.”<sup>66</sup> Khan also has identified his motto Iqbal and Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan. However this declaration will not be enough; Pakistan must examine its past. Something has definitely gone wrong in Pakistan. But what? One needs to revisit remarks made earlier in connection with this question. Pakistan has clearly failed to fulfill Iqbal’s dream and ideals. Who is responsible for this failure? While studying in Europe Iqbal

learned about the crisis of the European soul highlighted by Nietzsche, and as a believer, he became convinced that the Qur'an had the potential to guide Muslims alone, it could bring gratified soul to Europeans and the rest of the mankind as well. He had dreamt of Pakistan to be a model for such a development in the modern world. Iqbal succeeded in convincing Indian Muslims for this noble role in world history. As long as the struggle for achieving Pakistan continued, participants of the movement had complete devotion and motivation in translating Qur'anic guidance for good governance in the modern world. In post-independent Pakistan, however, Pakistani nationalist leaders failed to cultivate the same spirit among the Pakistani youth. Newly independent Pakistan's education policy turned out to be a complete sham. An educational policy based on the European worldview that emerged in response to the church's control of society, was introduced in Pakistan. Territorial integrity received priority over education. Armed forces and civil bureaucracies interrupted political developments. Traditional landed aristocracy joined the newly industrialized bourgeoisie in governing Pakistan. As a result national integration efforts failed. In the 25 years of its existence, the country was split: Most Pakistanis began to believe that since the two regions were divided by more than a thousand miles of enemy territory, it was natural for the country to be divided along those lines. Unfortunately, hardly any analysis or research was conducted on whether it was a mistake on the part of the founding fathers to conceive such a geographically divided nation. Pakistani researchers should examine not only their history; they should examine the rise of extremism in India. Is it an accident that Hindu nationalists are trying to through all minorities out of India? Isn't what Iqbal and Jinnah warned over a century ago?

It is also amazingly true that Pakistan has survived for more than 70 years, and this itself is a manifestation of its success. Pakistan was without a central secretariat in its capital Karachi and yet it was able to begin its journey: People were inspired by Iqbal's poetry and Jinnah's rousing speeches. Remarkably, as the current government has demonstrated, Iqbal and Jinnah still inspire many people today. These include not only Pakistanis and their hundreds and thousands in the diaspora, but also Muslims and non-Muslims all over the world. At a time when the European model of the nation-state system is being challenged in many parts of the world, Pakistan has a great potential to become an alternative model for universal peace and prosperity by following Iqbal's dream and

by fulfilling Qur'anic guidance for good governance. Pakistanis should contemplate Iqbal's call that "every Muslim nation must sink into her *deeper self*, temporarily focus her vision on herself alone."<sup>67</sup>

Pakistan's "deeper self" must be sought in the basic understanding of Islam. Discrepancies between words and deeds have led many to despair. Some sort of reflection of this sort may be found in *What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic* by Shahab Ahmed, a Pakistani American who was brought up in Malaysia and attended a boarding school in England: his last work has been posthumously published by the Princeton University Press.<sup>68</sup> One may disagree with Ahmed's understanding of Islam, but his work demonstrates the fact that by means of disagreements throughout history.

## ENDNOTES

- 1 <http://www.jaihoon.com/5814.htm>
- 2 See an Aljazeera documentary <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BjPCo-FUyTM>
- 3 See, Carlton J H Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931).
- 4 For a good discussion on the subject, see Zafar I Ansari, "Iqbal and Nationalism", *Iqbal Review*, vol. II (1961), 51–89.
- 5 See S.A. Vahid, *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*. (Lahore: Ashraf, 1964), 396.
- 6 On this question, see Sharif al-Mujahid, "Muslim Nationalism," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 2: 1 (July 1985), 29–40.
- 7 Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), 159.
- 8 Khalifah Abdul Hakim, "Renaissance in Indo-Pakistan; Iqbal," in M. M. Sharif, *A History of Muslim Philosophy*. (Wiesbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, 1966), 1614–1633: 1616.
- 9 Mustansir Mir, *Iqbal*. (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 2008), 17.
- 10 Interestingly nobody raised any objection to this appointment although an obvious question arises as to how an Islamic constitution could have been drafted under the leadership of a non-Muslim. In our view, Jinnah as a lawyer was well aware of the demands of a constitution and the worldview of Mandal and he found no contradiction in his act. Jinnah also helped B R Ambedkar, the first law minister of India and formulator of the Indian constitution, to get elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1946 from Muslim reserved seat in Bengal when he failed to get elected from a general Hindu-majority seat.
- 11 Quoted in G. W. Choudhury, *Constitution Development in Pakistan* (London: Longman, 1959), 63–4.
- 12 See, Akbar Ahmad, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin*. (London: Routledge, 1997), 192–194.
- 13 Ibid, 194.

- 14 See for example, Ajeet Javed, *Secular and Nationalist Jinnah*. London: Oxford University Press, 2009 and Seleena Karim, *Secular Jinnah and Pakistan What the Nation Doesn't Know*. London: Checkpoint Press, 2010. In reality, Neither Jinnah nor Iqbal seem to have ever used the term secularism in their exposition of the idea of Pakistan.
- 15 The resolution was opposed only by the reminiscent of INC, which had opposed to the creation of Pakistan.
- 16 G.W. Choudhury, 65.
- 17 *Ibid.* 51-3.
- 18 Quoted in Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: Jama'at-I Islami of Pakistan*. (London: I.B.Tauris, 1994), 117.
- 19 *Ibid.*, 174-5.
- 20 *Ibid.*, 70.
- 21 On this subject, see Ralph Braibanti, "Cornelius of Pakistan: Catholic Chief Justice of a Muslim state" in *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, Vol. 10, No 2, 1999.
- 22 On Asad's view on the subject, see Muhammad Asad, *The Principles of State and Government in Islam*. Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1980.
- 23 See description of the circumstances by his personal physician Ilahi Baksh (Colonel), *With the Quaid-i-Azam During His Last Days*. Lahore: Maktabatul Ma'aref, 1949.
- 24 See Khalid B. Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change* (New York: Praeger, 1980), 32-46.
- 25 For his version of Pakistan's turbulent history, see Muhammad Munir, *From Jinnah to Zia*. Lahore: Vanguard, 1979.
- 26 Saleena Karim, See particularly Chapter 2, 29-41.
- 27 See Sharif al-Mujahid, *Quaid-i-Azam: Studies in Interpretation*. Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1981. Also see Javed Iqbal, *Ideology of Pakistan*. Lahore: Ferozsons, 1971. Although the book was published before the publication of Munir's book, it was based on the controversy on the subject in the 1950s.
- 28 A good evidence for civil-military partnership may be found in a letter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who wrote to Iskandar Ali Khan Mirza on April 1958 saying. "I would like to take this opportunity to reassure you of my imperishable and devoted loyalty to you. Exactly four months before the death of my late Father, he had advised me to remain steadfastly loyal to you; as you were 'not an individual but an institution.' For the greater good of my own country I feel that your services to Pakistan are indispensable. When the history of this country is written by objective historians, your name will be placed even before that of Mr. Jinnah."
- 29 M. S. Venkataramani, *The American Role in Pakistan 1947-1958*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1982.
- 30 See, Srinath Raghavan, 1971 *A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013.
- 31 Ishtiaq H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent (610-1947): A Brief Historical Survey* (S. Gravenhage: Mouton, 1962), 83-163.
- 32 Suresh Chandra Ghosh, *The History of Education in Modern India 1757-1998*. Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan Publishers, 2009.
- 33 See, David Kopf, *British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance: The Dynamics of Indian Modernization 1773-1835*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1969.
- 34 See, Mahmudur Rahman, *The Political History of Muslim Bengal: An Unfinished Battle of Faith*. (London: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2019), 33-69.

- 35 Christine E. Dobbin, ed. *Basic Documents in the Development of Modern India and Pakistan 1835-1947* (London: Van Nostrand, 1970), 8.
- 36 On education in Pakistan see the personal account of the Pakistan educator Ishtiaq H. Qureshi, *Education in Pakistan: An Inquiry into Objectives and Achievements* (Karachi: Ma'ref, 1975).
- 37 See his own book on the subject: Fazlur Rahman, *New Education in the Making of Pakistan* (London: Cassell, 1953), 6 and *passim*.
- 38 Ishtiaq H. Qureshi, *Perspective of Islam and Pakistan* (Karachi: Ma'ref, 1979), 47-8. The author quotes one bureaucrat as saying to him: 'We should first satisfy the hunger of the poor, luxuries like education will come later.' *Ibid.*, 218n. Another bureaucrat suggested abolishing the departments of Arabic and Persian in order to overcome the university's financial burden. See *Ibid.* 225n.
- 39 *Ibid.*, 49-72.
- 40 *Ibid.* 70-1.
- 41 *Ibid.* 45-62.
- 42 *Ibid.* 122-44.
- 43 This has been highlighted well in Farzana Shaikh, *Making sense of Pakistan*. (London: Hurst, 2009).
- 44 Ali Nawaz Memon, *Pakistan: Islamic Nation in Crisis*. (Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 1997), XIII.
- 45 Pakistan was constituted of Baluchistan, North-West Frontier Province, Western Punjab and Sind in the western part and East Bengal in eastern part of the British India. The two territories were separated by thousand miles of the Indian territory.
- 46 According to one report, nine years after the creation of Pakistan, only 51 top-level policy-making positions were occupied by Bengalis in the central government, out of a total 741 such positions, while 98 per cent of the military officers came from Western Pakistan. See Nasir Islam, "Islam and National Identity: The Case of Pakistan and Bangladesh," *International Journal of the Middle East Studies*, 13 (1981), 63. On the discrepancy between the two wings of Pakistan, see a contemporary account by Raunaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).
- 47 For a good description of Bhutto's behavior, see Muhammad Abrar Zahoor "Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Political Behaviour and Ouster from Power" in *Journal of the Punjab University Historical Society*. Vol. 30 No. 2 (July - December 2017), 93-104.
- 48 Followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad who claimed to be a prophet.
- 49 See, "Hijack that changed history" <https://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/gk-magazine/hijack-that-changed-history/>
- 50 <https://www.nytimes.com/1971/12/16/archives/bhutto-denounces-council-and-walks-out-in-tears-weeping-bhutto.html>
- 51 See Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam*. (London: T.B. Tauris, 2007).
- 52 <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/22/world/asia/22pakistan.html>
- 53 Interestingly one British diplomat while analyzing this period of Pakistan's history came up with the recommendation that Pakistan be left on Pakistanis. See Hilary Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan: Ways Out of Instability*. (London: IISS, 2009).
- 54 On this subject, see Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990* (Hertfordshire: Roxford Books, 1991).

- 55 See "White Paper on Elections in Kashmir," by The All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), Sri Nagar, Kashmir. At [www.kashmir-cc.ca/mic/whitepaper.htm](http://www.kashmir-cc.ca/mic/whitepaper.htm). Accessed on April 8, 2010.
- 56 See [www.jammu-kashmir.com/document/simla.html](http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/document/simla.html)
- 57 Ibid.
- 58 See [www.rediff.com/news/2008/oct/05indpak.htm](http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/oct/05indpak.htm)
- 59 For a discussion on the subject, see Niloufar Siddiqui on conspiracy theory in Pakistan <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1354068817749777?journalCode=ppqa>.
- 60 See <https://tribune.com.pk/story/736390/post-partition-india-still-owes-pakistan-a-little-over-rs5-6b-says-state-bank/>
- 61 The Soviet Union has cast vetoes in 1957 and 1962 on Kashmir and in 3 vetoes in 1971 to support India's war against Pakistan. See, [https://www.rbth.com/blogs/stranger\\_than\\_fiction/2016/11/01/veto-no100-how-russia-blocked-the-west-on-kashmir\\_644137](https://www.rbth.com/blogs/stranger_than_fiction/2016/11/01/veto-no100-how-russia-blocked-the-west-on-kashmir_644137); and <http://www.storypick.com/soviet-using-veto/>
- 62 See, Srinath Raghavan, *1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).
- 63 See, [www.nowpublic.com/world/obama-mulls-clinton-special-envoy-kashmir](http://www.nowpublic.com/world/obama-mulls-clinton-special-envoy-kashmir). Accessed on September 4, 2011.
- 64 [www.indiandaily.com/editorial/20540.asp](http://www.indiandaily.com/editorial/20540.asp)
- 65 See, "India's stealth lobbying against Holbrooke's brief," in *Foreign Policy*. (January 24, 2009).
- 66 <https://pmo.gov.pk/documents/manifesto-pti.pdf>
- 67 See above 3. The italics emphasize the point.
- 68 Shahab Ahmed, *What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

### Abstract

This article presents the conception of Allama Iqbal about Democracy, Nationalism and Communism and he explained these are actually facets of the tyranny of imperialism as the spirit of freedom and the dignity of man are being trampled underfoot in a way to which not even the darkest period of human history presents a parallel. He believed that the Muslim community (Ummah) had the potential to be a model for the humanity, and he wanted Pakistan to take the initiative to revive the Ummah with the spirit of humanism. One of the early challenges that Pakistan encountered as a sovereign nation-state was the framing of a constitution that would ensure universal values of human dignity and equality as opposed to a narrow nationalistic loom. Pakistan has a great potential to become an alternative model for universal peace and prosperity by following Iqbal's dream and by fulfilling Qur'anic guidance for good governance. Pakistanis should contemplate Iqbal's call that "every Muslim nation must sink into her *deeper self*, temporarily focus her vision on herself alone.

**Keyword:** Iqbal's conception of democracy, deeper self, Muslim Ummah